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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Christopher Michael Cangro appeals from the district court’s order granting in part the

state’s

motion for summary dismissal and denying

in part his

motion for summary disposition 0f

his petition for post—conviction relief.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The

On the night of July 20,

2017, Cangro was

At around 12:45

Ls.6-11; p.216, Ls.10-14.1)

Cowgirls, a different bar,

Proceedings
at the

a.m.,

Longhorn bar

home.

(E

Trial Tr., p.133, L.22

Cangro

alcohol,

had slowed and slurred speech, and glassy bloodshot

(Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1 1-17.)

at a

— p.139,

arrested

at his

(Trial Tr., p.201,

his motorcycle near

t0 initiate a trafﬁc stop.

Rather than stop, Cangro drove off

around several road blockages.

Kuna.

Cangro was driving

when law enforcement attempted

p.121, Ls.8—22; p.132, Ls.6-8.)

in

(Trial Tr.,

high rate 0f speed and

L.7.)

Law

enforcement

Ofﬁcers noticed Cangro smelled of
eyes.

(Trial Tr., p.187, L.18

—

p.188, L.21.) Cangro refused t0 complete standard ﬁeld sobriety tests or provide breath 0r blood

samples. (Trial Tr., p.191, Ls.1-5; p.193, L.4

The

state

(R., pp.44-45.)

counts.

— p.194,

L.4.)

charged Cangro with felony eluding a police ofﬁcer and misdemeanor DUI.

The matter proceeded

(E R., pp.70-80.)

to a jury trial at

For felony eluding, the

Which the jury found Cangro

district court

guilty of both

sentenced Cangro t0 ﬁve years

With two years ﬁxed, suspended the sentence, and ordered four years 0f probation; for

misdemeanor DUI, the

1

district court

The trial and sentencing
Record on pages 157-247.

sentenced Cangro to thirty days ofj ail. (R., pp.1 13-15.)

transcripts, attached t0

Cangro’s petition as Exhibit C, appear in the

Citations t0 “Trial Tr.” will use the transcript’s internal pagination.

Cangro ﬁled a timely petition

for post-conviction relief claiming counsel

for failing to confront a witness with her prior inconsistent statement.

discovery, the state disclosed

am. and

pm.

(Trial

At

trial,

summary

was seen driving

ﬂ alﬂ

at

12:45

Cangro

state’s theories that

am. and

Trial Tr., p.286, L.24

that

—

trial

strategic 0r tactical decision,

petition.

The

state objected t0

left

left

the

Longhorn

around 12:30-12:45 a.m.,

Cangro was drinking elsewhere

p.287, L.10; p.311, Ls.2-4.)

Cangro moved

Along with

(R., pp.263-73.)

(m
for

his motion,

counsel stating that counsel was aware of Prindle’s prior

inconsistent statement t0 law enforcement, failed to

pp.279-80.)

the bar around 12:30-

he eluded ofﬁcers to avoid getting a DUI.

disposition of his petition in his favor.

Cangro submitted an afﬁdavit from

was not a

In

TL, p.201, L.25 — p.202, L.1.) Cangro argued counsel was ineffective

Which he asserted would have refuted the

R., pp.11-13;

left

Prindle testiﬁed Cangro

for failing to confront Prindle with her prior statement that

before he

(R., pp.5-14.)

a later interview in which she recalled Cangro leaving the bar around 10:30 p.m.

(E EX. E (3:00-3:07); EX. H (5114-5230).)
bar at 10:30

ineffective

two interviews With Longhorn bartender Tambra Prindle—an

interview from the night of the incident in which she estimated Cangro

12245

was

and

impeach her with

that failure

was

Cangro’s motion and

that statement, that failure

prejudicial to Cangro’s defense.

moved

summary

for

(R.,

dismissal of his

(R., pp.281-94.)

After a hearing, the district court granted in part and denied in part both parties” motions.

(m

generally Tr.;

ﬂ alﬁ

R., pp.331-37.)

First, the district court

granted in part Cangro’s

motion for summary disposition, vacating Cangro’s conviction for misdemeanor DUI.
pp.334-35.)

The

district court

found that counsel was deﬁcient for

with her inconsistent statement.

(R., p.335.)

The

(R.,

failing to confront Prindle

district court also

found that Cangro was

prejudiced by that deﬁciency; because the state’s case relied on an impairment theory, not a

speciﬁc

BAC, and

the state’s theory

unaccounted-for time between
there

that

was a reasonable
Cangro was

summary

the

DUI.

when he

probability that

at the

that

left

Cangro consumed alcohol

the

Longhorn and was

impeachment evidence

Longhorn during

outcome on the DUI charge.
for

was

(R., p.335.)

that entire time

another bar during the

seen by law enforcement,

that Prindle told

law enforcement

Window would have changed

the

Therefore, the district court granted Cangro’s motion

disposition and denied the state’s motion for

summary

dismissal of the petition on

(R., p.335, 339.)

Next, the

district

court granted in part the state’s motion for

dismissing Cangro’s petition as to the eluding conviction.
ﬁrst noted that motive

At

(R., p.336.)

not

later

at

know

trial,

is

summary

(R., pp.336-37.)

The

dismissal,

district court

not an element 0f eluding and did not need t0 be proven by the

Cangro admitted

the vehicle behind

to attempting t0 elude the police but testiﬁed that

him and was

afraid.

(R., pp.336-37.)

state.

he did

Thus, the factual dispute

centered on whether Cangro willfully ﬂed, given his testimony that he never saw the activated

police lights.

(R., p.337.)

Therefore, the district court concluded that the deﬁciency prong

was

not satisﬁed because “Prindle’s testimony concerning Petitioner’s whereabouts prior to his

encounter With the police and subsequent attempt t0 elude are unrelated factually.” (R., p.337.)

Nor was

the prejudice prong satisﬁed

where “there

is

n0 reasonable probability

0f the felony eluding charge would have been different.”

(R., p.337.)

Cangro’s motion for summary disposition and granted the

state’s

The

that the

outcome

district court

denied

motion for summary dismissal

as to the eluding charge. (R., p.337.)

The

district court

entered judgment vacating Cangro’s

DUI

conviction and denying

Cangro’s petition for post-conviction relief as t0 his eluding conviction.

ﬁled a timely notice of appeal.

(R., pp.341-43.)

(R., p.339.)

Cangro

ISSUE
Cangro

Did the

states the issue

on appeal

district court err in

as:

denying Mr. Cangro’s motion for summary disposition and

dismissing the ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the eluding conviction, as the

record establishes both deﬁcient performance and prejudice?
(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Cangro failed t0 show that the district court erred when it denied his motion
summary disposition and granted the state’s motion for summary dismissal of his petition
post-conviction relief as to his eluding conviction?

for
for

ARGUMENT
Cangro Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion For
Summary Disposition And Granted The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal Of His Petition
For Post-Conviction Relief As To His Eluding Conviction
A.

Introduction

Cangro argues

when

that the district court erred

it

dismissed his petition for post-

conviction relief as to his eluding conviction. Cangro asserts that he
the state argued that he eluded the ofﬁcer t0 avoid getting a

Prindle

was

state did

is

entitled t0 relief because

DUI and counsel’s

failure t0

impeach

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-18.) However, the

therefore relevant to rebut that motive.

not need to prove motive beyond a reasonable doubt, and impeachment 0f Prindle’s

testimony would not have impacted the state’s eluding case.
including Cangro’s

own

behind him and drove

at

testimony, established that Cangro

at trial,

saw Deputy Hickham’s vehicle

speeds up t0 80 miles per hour, around barricades, and off the main road

The only dispute was Whether Cangro saw

t0 elude that vehicle.

Prindle’s testimony about

what time Cangro

left

the

Longhorn was

element of the crime of eluding, was not the sole basis 0f the
failure t0 confront her

The undisputed evidence

state’s

the activated police lights.

factually unrelated t0

any

motive theory, and counsel’s

With her inconsistent statement about that time would therefore have had

no impact on the outcome of that charge. Thus, the

district court

properly summarily dismissed

Cangro’s petition for post-conviction relief from his eluding conviction.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“On review of a

dismissal 0f a post-conviction relief application Without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue 0f fact exists based

on the pleadings,

depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits 0n ﬁle and will liberally construe the

facts

and reasonable inferences

of the non—moving party.”

in favor

Charboneau

V. State,

144

Idaho 900, 903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

C.

The District Court Properly Granted The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal And
Denied Cangro’s Motion For Summary Disposition Of His Petition As T0 The Eluding
Charge

A petition
which the
State,

for post-conViction relief initiates a

new and independent

petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he

144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State

662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

is

V.

proceeding in

entitled t0 relief.

veriﬁed post—conviction petition
hearing,

deemed

true.

making a prima

facie case as to each essential

However, the court

is

V.

Until controverted

by

Moreover, the

the state, allegations in a

not required t0 accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by

Roman V.

State,

district court, as the trier

the party opposing the motion for

at the

131

96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975).

State,

admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Farrier

25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001);

V. State,

purposes of determining whether t0 hold an evidentiary

are, for

Cooper

V.

a petition for post—conviction

element of the claims upon Which the applicant bears the burden 0f proof.” Berg
Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).

Workman

Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678,

A district court may summarily dismiss

relief if the petitioner “has not presented evidence

civil

most probable inferences

t0

V. State,

135 Idaho 797, 799,

125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).

of

fact, is

summary

not constrained to draw inferences in favor 0f

disposition; rather, the district court is free t0 arrive

be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes

V. State,

146

Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008).

Further, allegations contained in a post-

conviction petition are insufﬁcient for granting relief

when

they are clearly disproved by the

record of the original proceeding 0r do not justify relief as a matter of law.

at 522,

164 P.3d

Workman, 144 Idaho

at 802.

A post-conviction petitioner

alleging ineffective assistance 0f counsel

Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

both deﬁcient performance and resulting prejudice.

687-88 (1984); State

V.

Strickland, a defendant

must demonstrate

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

must demonstrate both

that (1) counsel’s

performance

Under

below an

fell

objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been

different.

466 U.S.

Strickland,

694; Aragon V. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988).

presumption that counsel’s conduct
assistance.

Gibson

V. State,

is

110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis

counsel.

Roman, 125 Idaho

The

district court

at

for the

that

it

DUI charge by failing t0

make

facie case for ineffective assistance

0f

a prima facie case 0f ineffective assistance of counsel

district court

found that counsel provided deﬁcient performance

confront Prindle with her prior inconsistent statement,

it

Cangro has

properly

failed t0

deﬁciency affected his representation 0f Cangro for the eluding charge or

had any impact 0n the outcome, given

undisputed evidence

116

properly summarily dismissed Cangro’s petition as to the eluding

Although the

that counsel’s

V. State,

Bare assertions and speculation,

determined that deﬁciency was factually unrelated to the eluding charge.

show

a strong

649, 873 P.2d at 903.

conviction because Cangro failed t0

as to that charge.

1989).

d0 not make out a prima

facts,

is

687-88,

Within the Wide range 0f reasonable professional

Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App.

unsupported by speciﬁc

There

at

at trial established that

that the state did not

Cangro engaged

police vehicle behind him, and the time Cangro left the

need

t0

prove motive, the

in a high-speed ﬂight

Longhorn was immaterial

from the

t0 the charge.

First,

undisputed that motive

it is

prove beyond a reasonable doubt

at trial.

is

not an element of eluding that the state needed t0

(E R., p.336; Appellant’s brief, p.17; ﬂ alﬂ I.C.

In order to prove felony eluding, the jury

§ 49-1404.)

prove beyond a reasonable doubt

was

instructed that the state needed t0

that:

1.

On 0r about July 21, 2017

2.

in the state

3.

While driving a motor vehicle,

4.

the defendant Christopher

5.

a pursuing police vehicle

6.

When

of Idaho,

Cangro willfully ﬂed or attempted

to elude

a peace ofﬁcer had given the defendant a Visual 0r audible signal to bring the

defendant’s vehicle t0 a stop, and
traveled in excess 0f thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed limit.

7.

(R., p.97.)

purpose.

The

instructions also provided “[a]n act

One can

any advantage.”
state

needed

to

P.3d 921, 926
so

by

statute.”).

not need t0

2

Cangro
is

When done on

Thus, motive was not an element of the crime 0f eluding that the

prove in order to prevail

App. 2008) (“Motive

As

at trial.

is

E

Thomas

V. State,

decide—why Mr. Cangro

prove—and

it is

made

the jury did

eluded, only that he did.” (R., p.292 (italics in original).)2

asserts that the district court erred

on

145 Idaho 765, 770, 185

not an essential element of any crime unless

the state argued below, “[t]he state did not need t0

the motive t0 elude police based

DUI

or done ‘Willfully’

act willfully without intending t0 Violate the law, 0r injure another, or acquire

(R., p.103.)

(Ct.

is ‘Willful’

When

his belief that

it

stated that “[W]hether 0r not Petitioner

had

he was intoxicated and subject to the crime of

immaterial to the crime charged.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12 (quoting R., p.336).) Read in

context, the district court

was Cangro’s motive

was making

clear that the state’s case did not require

in order t0 secure a conviction.

(E R., pp.336-37.)

it

t0

prove that

Second, the undisputed evidence
ofﬁcer; the only dispute

was whether he did so

willfully.

around 12:45 a.m., he saw Cangro’s motorcycle driving.

Hickham drove behind
motorcycle

come

to a

Deputy Cody Hickham testiﬁed
(Trial Tr., p.121, Ls.8-22.)

complete stop

at intersections,

and speed

miles per hour in a 25 miles per hour zone. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.2-22; p.125, L.11

As

Hickham

they approached an intersection, Deputy

p.127, Ls.6-1

1.)

t0 elude the

that

Deputy

marked law enforcement vehicle and noticed the

the motorcycle in his

fail t0 signal, fail t0

Cangro attempted

at trial established that

at

around 48

— p.126,

activated his police lights.

L.2.)

(Trial

TL,

Deputy Hickham estimated he was around twenty yards behind the motorcycle

With the lights activated t0 the highest setting—red and blue lights 0n the vehicle brush guard,

overhead

lights

With the highest intensity, rear

lights,

and “Wigwag

lights,

headlights alternate between brights on and brights 0ff...and per Idaho

Visible Within a thousand feet.” (Trial T11, p.132, L.19

In

response,

the

— p.133,

Which

Code

is

that has t0

motorcycle drove through the intersection without stopping and

—

veered off the road into the
p.134, L.18

—

p.134, L.9.)

The

onto the next road with his lights

street

came

near a ditch and turned

dirt

p.135, L.3; R., p.144.) Deputy

still

on.

t0 a

left

p.136, Ls.13-19; p.138, Ls.12-15.)

As

down

Hickham followed

another

street.

Hickham became concerned

was

getting

the driver

(Trial

TL,

the motorcycle through the dirt

(Trial Tr., p.136, Ls.3-4.)

the motorcycle

(Trial Tr.,

dead end ahead; the motorcycle

The motorcycle approached

another road closure and barricade at the end 0f the street but continued around

slipped and Deputy

be

L.9.)

“continued t0 accelerate very purposefully,” reaching speeds 0f 80 miles per hour.
p.132, Ls.6-8; p.133, L.24

Where your

it.

(Trial

back 0n the road, the back

would

TL,
tire

further endanger himself or

wreck, so he deactivated his police lights but continued t0 follow. (Trial TL, p.136, Ls.3-12, 2025.)

The motorcycle continued

to a third road barricade,

drove past

it,

and through a canal bank.

Deputy Hickham called

(Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.2-7; R., p.145.)

in the motorcycle’s plates

and

coordinated with other ofﬁcers to intercept the motorcycle; the ofﬁcers arrested Cangro at his

home.

(Trial T11, p.144, L.11

Cangro testiﬁed
motorcycle

at

t0

— p.145,

L.10.)

He

an identical version of events.

around 12:45 am. and saw a vehicle behind him. (Trial

Ls.10-12.) Cangro admitted he did not

come

(Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.9-1 1; p.240, Ls.4-8.)

that the vehicle

close so he rolled through the next intersection and “gunned

behind” him, driving 80 miles per hour. (Trial
p.242, L.10.)

He

Tr.,

— p.244,

was “doing everything

in [his]

t0 get

—

power

Tr.,

to get

his

p.218, Ls.1-4; p.239,

and was speeding.

behind him came up

away from

the car that

was

p.221, L.12; p.222, Ls.20-22;

(Trial Tr., p.223, Ls.13-19; p.224,

L.1; p.245, Ls.13-24; p.246, Ls.12—24.)

could see the vehicle and headlights behind him. (Trial
testiﬁed he

it

p.220, L.25

drove around road signs and barricades.

Ls.10-15; p.243, Ls.15-17; p.243, L.24

Tr.,

to a ﬁlll stop at the intersection

Cangro testiﬁed

was driving

testiﬁed that he

Cangro

p.224, L.23; p.244, Ls.2-8.) Cangro

away” from the

vehicle.

(Trial Tr.,

p.241, Ls.9-12.)

Thus, the only disputed issue

at trial

was Whether Cangro recognized

that the vehicle

behind him was law enforcement attempting to pull him over. Deputy Hickham testiﬁed that

was a

dark, clear

summer night and

there

was nothing obstructing

his

View of the motorcycle nor

anything that he could see that would have obstructed the motorcyclist’s View of him. (Trial
p.142, L.19

— p.143,

L.10.)

Cangro’s body type and

Deputy Hickham could

tattoos,

clearly see the motorcycle

and

its

T11,

plates,

and type 0f helmet he was wearing, which was a half helmet

With straps that came

down the

L.8 — p.142, L.18.)

Although Cangro testiﬁed

activated police lights.

it

sides that

would not have obstructed
that

(Trial Tr., p.221, L.13-15.)

10

his Vision.

(Trial T11, p.141,

he saw headlights, he denied seeing the

However, Deputy Hickham testiﬁed

that

he

believed Cangro saw the police lights; before he activated the lights, Cangro accelerated t0

around 48 miles per hour
t0

after

each intersection; after he activated the

Cangro accelerated

80 miles per hour and was “just doing everything he could t0 get away from” Deputy

Hickham.

(Trial Tr., p.175,

L.16 — p.176, L24.)

Given the elements of eluding and the evidence

eluding charge and did not impact

Longhorn was a key

its

properly found

at trial, the district court

that counsel’s failure to confront Prindle about her prior statement

the

lights,

was

factually unrelated t0 the

outcome. While the disputed timeline of when Cangro

factual dispute with regards t0 the

DUI,

it

was simply

irrelevant t0 the

eluding charge. Regardless of which of Prindle’s statements was correct, Whether Cangro

Longhorn

at

10:30

Longhorn, there

is

pm.

and attempted

to pull

is

Cangro was driving

that

n0 dispute

that

Cangro over. There

was Whether Cangro saw

willingly.

irrelevant.

his motorcycle at 12:45

am.

Deputy Hickham was driving behind Cangro
is

no dispute

hour and drove around several road barricades
dispute

left

the

or 12:30 a.m., 0r Whether Cangro went to a different bar after the

no dispute

July 21, 2017. There

left

to elude

that

Cangro accelerated

Deputy Hickham’s

t0

in

Kuna on

at that

time

80 miles an

vehicle.

The only

the police lights and therefore attempted t0 elude the ofﬁcer

Where Cangro was coming from was

irrelevant.

What time he

left

the

Longhorn was

Accordingly, any impeachment of Prindle regarding what speciﬁc time she saw

Cangro come and go was factually unrelated and ultimately immaterial

When

Therefore, the district court did not err

it

to the eluding charge.

granted the state’s motion in part and summarily

dismissed Cangro’s petition as to the eluding charge.

Cangro concedes

ﬂ alﬁ

R., p.305.)

failure to

that

motive

is

However, motive

impeach Prindle

not an element 0f eluding.

is

the only thread With

to the eluding conviction.
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Cangro

(E Appellant’s brief, p.17;

Which he attempts

to tie counsel’s

asserts that “[a]bsent a

motive to

run, the state’s evidence

0n the eluding charge was weak” and

that,

“given Mr. Cangro’s

testimony, the jury could have rationally found that the deputy never activated his overhead

Cangro

Cangro then argues

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

1ights....”

to literally risk life

and limb

Simply

(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

that “[t]here

to avoid a trafﬁc stop if

put, those

was n0 reason

for

Mr.

he was not under the inﬂuence.”

arguments have nothing to d0 with Prindle’s

testimony 0r counsel’s failure t0 confront her With her prior inconsistent statement.

First,

contrary to his assertion, the state’s evidence on eluding

hinge on motive.

Cangro himself testiﬁed

that

was strong and did not

he sped off in an attempt t0 ﬂee the vehicle

behind him, bypassing road barriers and reaching speeds 0f 80 miles per hour.

The

state’s

eluding case did not depend 0n Whether Cangro was also committing, charged with, or ultimately

convicted of DUI.

As

discussed above, the state did not need t0 prove Cangro’s motive for

eluding, only that he did so.

DUI

is

Further, the theory that

Cangro was attempting

to avoid getting a

supported by the evidence, even Without Prindle’s testimony. Deputy Geisel testiﬁed that

Cangro smelled 0f alcohol, had slurred and slow speech, and glassy bloodshot eyes When ofﬁcers

him

arrested

failed t0

Cangro

outside his home.

show

left

the

(ﬂ Trial

Tr.,

p.187, L.18

that counsel’s failure t0 question

Longhorn had an impact on the

— p.188,

L.21.) Therefore,

Whether Prindle was mistaken about the time

state’s eluding case.

Second, the jury necessarily found that Deputy Hickham activated his
p.97.)

Deputy Hickham testiﬁed

that

Cangro has

he activated his

lights;

lights.

(E R.,

Cangro testiﬁed he did not see

police lights, but he did not challenge the deputy’s testimony that the lights were activated.

There

is

no basis beyond bare speculation

have been

Longhorn

at all affected

at

10:30

t0

conclude that the jury’s decision on that issue would

by counsel questioning

pm.
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Prindle’s recollection that

Cangro

left

the

Last, although

Cangro argues

that a person

evasion if that person was intoxicated,
high-risk, high-Speed, off—road

(E Trial

Tr.,

that the district court erred

undisputed that he did just

maneuvers he took

did not need t0 prove, although

intoxicated.

it is

it

in high-speed, high-risk

that.

He

testiﬁed to the

t0 avoid the vehicle pursuing him.

The

state

put on evidence, that Cangro did so because he was

it

p.187, L.18

When

would only engage

—

p.188, L.21.) Accordingly, Cangro has failed to

summarily dismissed

show

his petition as t0 the eluding conviction.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of the

district court.

DATED this 27th day of November, 2020.
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